Certification best practices

Maybe I should just argue something like:

Creating an account is not that easy and takes time. Still, we will have tools to dected suspicious accounts allowing us to reject them or ban them from the system.


Let’s dig up the idea, and even try with communities of 1 member! We can still exchange currencies, we already do that with Bitcoin, Euro, Dollar, no problem.

The difference is that this way, you create individual currencies, that is, currencies at the smallest possible level. But such currencies are not common currencies and does not solve the three productors problem because you don’t have any shared value.

Individual currencies are pure barter as the essence of each currency is to be a particular value, in the sense of individual.

Currency is a lubricant for exchanges, we should not forget this central role. The bigger the currency, the more it is efficient for exchanges. Individual currencies are actually the worst possible solution of currency.

So the actual solution is to create the widest possible currencies we can. Note that this doesn’t mean we need to create only 1 world scale currency, but rather make cyrrency systems allowing to create such currencies if men want it.

In the outlined suggestion about I was talking about to use a meta currency that unites them.
Wouldnt this solve the three productors problem?
One community leaving the meta currency could be treated like one member leaving one community.
So all coins generated up to the point where the community left, would be still treated equal to all other community coins.

Happy new year everyone :slight_smile:
I hope you had some nice holidays.

@cgeek: I tried to read into the Geconomicus rules paper during the holidays, but as I indicated before, my french isn’t very good and it’s not easy to get some sense from a google translated document… so I didn’t grasp all too much, except that money is visualized by different colored cards (wich differ in “money value” by factor 2?) and the difference in playing a free vs. dept currency is, that in dept money, the banker decides when additional money is created. I didn’t however understand what players in this game use money for: there are “value cards” (pencils, guitars, cars, …), but how are they used in the game?

Additionally, I’d appreciate if you could tell us something about your experiences when playing this game. Especially about the bahaviour of players in free vs. dept money games.

Creating an account is not that easy and takes time. Still, we will have tools to dected suspicious accounts allowing us to reject them or ban them from the system.

I still can’t get the idea why it’s hard in your eyes to create an account. ATM at least, it isn’t. How exactly should verification be processed in a future-coming go-live version of a UCoin currency? Must I only verify people I know in person? Must I have seen any identification document? Does a drivers license do? student ID? Or must I know the person at least 5 years?

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I prefer to let @vit, @kimamila or @Galuel answer you about Geconomicus rules and results, they are the specialists out here :smile:

Yes MetaBrouzouf currency isn’t constraining at all. Still, you have to consider that the certification process will be a long time process, or should I say a human time process.

So certifying someone will be costly for a certifier, because:

  • he will have a finite stock of certifications
  • he can make only 1 certification a week

These constraints, added to the distance rule, avoid sybil cancer. To sump up, these rules are just technical rules avoiding massive automated cheating.

Still, we shouldn’t forget about people who will organize themselves to create fake identities (at a human time scale though, since massive automated sybill attacks won’t work). We consider uCoin protocol shouldn’t care that much about them, and let the detection and ban tasks to humans directly.

For example, humans may create public websites displaying a list of potential cheaters according to blockchain analysis (should I recall that the blockchain is public, so anyone can check who certified who and when). This analysis could also be linked to a public place where people publish informations about their identity (why not State informations if they agree to do so) to strengthen the possible trust in their unique & living identity.

Maybe this is a mistake to think this way, I don’t know yet. All I try to make is a flying prototype. Maybe this won’t ever fly! But maybe some people will learn about our mistakes and makes something that will actually fly.

Grant me the benefit of doubt :slight_smile:

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how many certifications at max?
1 week could be little bit too less if we are in the starting phase
that means at max we could double every three weeks.
but of course it depends also on how many members are in the starting web of trust and how many of them take part actively in certifying people.

just to think about, we could also give en economical incentive:
for example if one wants to make more certifications in one week he has to pay the Universal Dividend of 7 Days.
This would encourage that people who did not verify take part in verification.

I think it is very hard to choose the right parameters from the beginning.

But then I could ask somebody who wants a second account the sum of UD 7 so that I can certify the sybil. Kind of a certification black market…

However I agree with you that we have to define good parameters from the start. We had an interesting discussion (in French) about this here: Validation identitaire - #43 by Shinra

I think @cgeek idea of having a public page analysing the blockchain in specific ways is also interesting. However I don’t see how we could ban cheaters other than refusing to certify them (but they could then get certified by other less scrupulous individuals)?
Other banning techniques introduce again the problem of centralisation. If we don’t want anybody “controlling” the people entering the system, we cannot have anybody controlling the exit either. Because then we would again have a currency controlled by individuals who have the power to ban others.

I think there could be some sort of computer-calculated “risk of cheating indicator” that people can be aware of when making transactions with others. However power is now in the hands of the algorithm… Because sellers could now refuse to sell to individuals having been identified by the algorithm as “high risk”.

What do you think?

I have ever propose to give possibility to do anti-certifications. This is decentralized ban. It’s may be not necessary, because their membership will expire.

Hmm from our discussions in the “validation identitaire” topic, I understood that web of trust allows multiple points of entry. If someone is not certified by a group of individuals (eg your archenemies :smiley:) then this person can get certified by another (eg your friends…)

However with anti-certifications, you also introduce multiple points of exit… Meaning that you can get banned because of just one group that does not want you in (eg your archenemies…) whereas your friends cannot do anything to “save” you…

Or perhaps you thought about this system in a different way?

I thought anti-certifications like that. You found a great issue of that proposition :smile:
Expiration is better even if they create some money.

We don’t know yet, like you said it is very hard to choose the right parameters. We have to make simulations to understand the impacts of each parameter in order to choose them.

Each individual has the power to add a distance constraint to any other individual through the distance rule. Indeed, by certifying someone, you create a potential path from you, to this someone, to newcomers. By this act, you are becoming a control point of the WoT. Absolutely all newcomers will have to have a path from you to them at the moment the join/renew (each member has to renew, every month for example).

This rule, however, applies from you only if you issued enough certifications (for example 3 in MetaBrouzouf) so this rule does not apply for people who do not certify anyone (this would avoid paths to exist! and no newcomer would be able to join ever).

By this act of certifying, you create a tension in the WoT. The WoT cannot extend much more than 3 individual from you (in MetaBrouzouf). So when a sybil will have to renew, your possible paths may lead it to be actually banned.

Note how I subtly always avoid judgement. :smile: Because condemning someone to be banned is an extremely severe human judgement, with very deep consequences, relaying the judged “thing” to a non-human. We should be very careful on this point, because since we accepted the RTM we also accepted the non-nuisance principle (also callable non-violence principle).

That’s notably why I do not want of “active” ban with anti-certifications. Some people may want to actively ban someone for wrong reasons. I rather propose to use the pacific way.

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its not really black, because transactions are transparent in the blockchain :smile:
Its just en economic incentive to certify people who come most-likely in.
For example if one does not manage to come in the paid UD would be gone.
With the current distance rule, just one honest member that is more then 3 certifications distance away is enough that an double account cannot come in :smile:

Ok, so in this case, responsibility for making account creation hard for cheaters is in the hands of existing members. I can agree on that, but I think there should be some sort of guideline for members about who to certify and who not. E.g.:

1.) Don’t certify an account if you believe the issuers identity might be faked.
2.) Don’t certify an account if you believe the issuer already has another certified account.
3.) Don’t certify an account if you believe the issuer purposely or carelessly violates rule 1 or 2 (the issuer certifies faked or double accounts)

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You are right. Edited Tutorial.

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ah… this was sudden :slight_smile:

Just a request to everyone: These 3 guidances were the ones I found most plausible to keep the WoT trustworthy, but there may be other factors, which may be equally or even more important. So please don’t stop here and post your thoughts on what else should be considered or how the individual guidelines might be realized by current and future members.

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wouldnt it be helpful, if someone who verified somebody, post in the forum what they exactly verified?

further i was thinking about that it would be good to allow some extra data to be included in an certifying transaction, the same way like currently in an normal transaction. This we could use to give some short information about what we verified.
I think the more transparent we are the better.

Also we should think about the minimum requirement for membership. like giving the full name + birth-year to look if someone was not yet registered. The birth year would be helpful to handle persons that happen to have the same name. in the long run the birth year could also help to have some kind of idea if the person is still alive

If my family or a best friend would join a free money, I will certified them without checking anything and I do not want to publish anywhere any information about them. I think this certification’s work should be decentralized, each one do what he think good to verifying.

We don’t need to care too much about potential double identities, a free money will be so much better even with people cheating. We are still at the beginning of the free money movement and no experimental free money have been launched.

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I think the cause (at least for me) for coming back to think about cheaters and double identities is, that I imagine the UD value to be in a dimension you could live from (or eventually you could live from some cheated accounts). For better imagination:
If each member would get a UD per month with an equivalent worth of maybe 100 Euro or more, this would attract much more cheaters as if it was about 1 Euro or less per month.

Is there any evidence about what worth a UD must be imagined?

if you compare it with the current money supply it would be round about 5 -10 euro per day.

of course things can get little bit tricky here, because it depends what you count into the money supply…

also currencies that have an incentive to circulate like ucoin has, tend to have less value but more circulation.

Note that as our experiences have shown when playing Geconomicus in France, when a community uses a libre money instead of a debt money system, way more value is created. (Almost twice as much in some games played)

I know that it’s hard to compare this to money supply in the current system because of the systems side effects. But just under the assumption that UD would be equivalent to todays 5 Euro per day, this means I’d be able to buy something of todays worth of ~150 Euro per month per member account without additional work. If I manage to create like 10 member accounts, then this would be ~1500 Euro. If it’s less work to create such accounts than to do something productive that earns me money with an equivalent worth of 1500 Euro, I’m sure there would be many that will try this.