I prefer to let @vit, @kimamila or @Galuel answer you about Geconomicus rules and results, they are the specialists out here
Yes MetaBrouzouf currency isnāt constraining at all. Still, you have to consider that the certification process will be a long time process, or should I say a human time process.
So certifying someone will be costly for a certifier, because:
he will have a finite stock of certifications
he can make only 1 certification a week
These constraints, added to the distance rule, avoid sybil cancer. To sump up, these rules are just technical rules avoiding massive automated cheating.
Still, we shouldnāt forget about people who will organize themselves to create fake identities (at a human time scale though, since massive automated sybill attacks wonāt work). We consider uCoin protocol shouldnāt care that much about them, and let the detection and ban tasks to humans directly.
For example, humans may create public websites displaying a list of potential cheaters according to blockchain analysis (should I recall that the blockchain is public, so anyone can check who certified who and when). This analysis could also be linked to a public place where people publish informations about their identity (why not State informations if they agree to do so) to strengthen the possible trust in their unique & living identity.
Maybe this is a mistake to think this way, I donāt know yet. All I try to make is a flying prototype. Maybe this wonāt ever fly! But maybe some people will learn about our mistakes and makes something that will actually fly.
how many certifications at max?
1 week could be little bit too less if we are in the starting phase
that means at max we could double every three weeks.
but of course it depends also on how many members are in the starting web of trust and how many of them take part actively in certifying people.
just to think about, we could also give en economical incentive:
for example if one wants to make more certifications in one week he has to pay the Universal Dividend of 7 Days.
This would encourage that people who did not verify take part in verification.
I think it is very hard to choose the right parameters from the beginning.
But then I could ask somebody who wants a second account the sum of UD 7 so that I can certify the sybil. Kind of a certification black marketā¦
However I agree with you that we have to define good parameters from the start. We had an interesting discussion (in French) about this here: Validation identitaire - #43 by Shinra
I think @cgeek idea of having a public page analysing the blockchain in specific ways is also interesting. However I donāt see how we could ban cheaters other than refusing to certify them (but they could then get certified by other less scrupulous individuals)?
Other banning techniques introduce again the problem of centralisation. If we donāt want anybody ācontrollingā the people entering the system, we cannot have anybody controlling the exit either. Because then we would again have a currency controlled by individuals who have the power to ban others.
I think there could be some sort of computer-calculated ārisk of cheating indicatorā that people can be aware of when making transactions with others. However power is now in the hands of the algorithmā¦ Because sellers could now refuse to sell to individuals having been identified by the algorithm as āhigh riskā.
I have ever propose to give possibility to do anti-certifications. This is decentralized ban. Itās may be not necessary, because their membership will expire.
Hmm from our discussions in the āvalidation identitaireā topic, I understood that web of trust allows multiple points of entry. If someone is not certified by a group of individuals (eg your archenemies ) then this person can get certified by another (eg your friendsā¦)
However with anti-certifications, you also introduce multiple points of exitā¦ Meaning that you can get banned because of just one group that does not want you in (eg your archenemiesā¦) whereas your friends cannot do anything to āsaveā youā¦
Or perhaps you thought about this system in a different way?
We donāt know yet, like you said it is very hard to choose the right parameters. We have to make simulations to understand the impacts of each parameter in order to choose them.
Each individual has the power to add a distance constraint to any other individual through the distance rule. Indeed, by certifying someone, you create a potential path from you, to this someone, to newcomers. By this act, you are becoming a control point of the WoT. Absolutely all newcomers will have to have a path from you to them at the moment the join/renew (each member has to renew, every month for example).
This rule, however, applies from you only if you issued enough certifications (for example 3 in MetaBrouzouf) so this rule does not apply for people who do not certify anyone (this would avoid paths to exist! and no newcomer would be able to join ever).
By this act of certifying, you create a tension in the WoT. The WoT cannot extend much more than 3 individual from you (in MetaBrouzouf). So when a sybil will have to renew, your possible paths may lead it to be actually banned.
Note how I subtly always avoid judgement. Because condemning someone to be banned is an extremely severe human judgement, with very deep consequences, relaying the judged āthingā to a non-human. We should be very careful on this point, because since we accepted the RTM we also accepted the non-nuisance principle (also callable non-violence principle).
Thatās notably why I do not want of āactiveā ban with anti-certifications. Some people may want to actively ban someone for wrong reasons. I rather propose to use the pacific way.
its not really black, because transactions are transparent in the blockchain
Its just en economic incentive to certify people who come most-likely in.
For example if one does not manage to come in the paid UD would be gone.
With the current distance rule, just one honest member that is more then 3 certifications distance away is enough that an double account cannot come in
Ok, so in this case, responsibility for making account creation hard for cheaters is in the hands of existing members. I can agree on that, but I think there should be some sort of guideline for members about who to certify and who not. E.g.:
1.) Donāt certify an account if you believe the issuers identity might be faked.
2.) Donāt certify an account if you believe the issuer already has another certified account.
3.) Donāt certify an account if you believe the issuer purposely or carelessly violates rule 1 or 2 (the issuer certifies faked or double accounts)
Just a request to everyone: These 3 guidances were the ones I found most plausible to keep the WoT trustworthy, but there may be other factors, which may be equally or even more important. So please donāt stop here and post your thoughts on what else should be considered or how the individual guidelines might be realized by current and future members.
wouldnt it be helpful, if someone who verified somebody, post in the forum what they exactly verified?
further i was thinking about that it would be good to allow some extra data to be included in an certifying transaction, the same way like currently in an normal transaction. This we could use to give some short information about what we verified.
I think the more transparent we are the better.
Also we should think about the minimum requirement for membership. like giving the full name + birth-year to look if someone was not yet registered. The birth year would be helpful to handle persons that happen to have the same name. in the long run the birth year could also help to have some kind of idea if the person is still alive
If my family or a best friend would join a free money, I will certified them without checking anything and I do not want to publish anywhere any information about them. I think this certificationās work should be decentralized, each one do what he think good to verifying.
We donāt need to care too much about potential double identities, a free money will be so much better even with people cheating. We are still at the beginning of the free money movement and no experimental free money have been launched.
I think the cause (at least for me) for coming back to think about cheaters and double identities is, that I imagine the UD value to be in a dimension you could live from (or eventually you could live from some cheated accounts). For better imagination:
If each member would get a UD per month with an equivalent worth of maybe 100 Euro or more, this would attract much more cheaters as if it was about 1 Euro or less per month.
Is there any evidence about what worth a UD must be imagined?
Note that as our experiences have shown when playing Geconomicus in France, when a community uses a libre money instead of a debt money system, way more value is created. (Almost twice as much in some games played)
I know that itās hard to compare this to money supply in the current system because of the systems side effects. But just under the assumption that UD would be equivalent to todays 5 Euro per day, this means Iād be able to buy something of todays worth of ~150 Euro per month per member account without additional work. If I manage to create like 10 member accounts, then this would be ~1500 Euro. If itās less work to create such accounts than to do something productive that earns me money with an equivalent worth of 1500 Euro, Iām sure there would be many that will try this.
@Inso: Again this ominous game that I couldnāt really decipher the rules for
One question: Is it possible within the games rules/possibilities to get more than 1 UD (the equivalent to fake member accounts)?
yea would be really great to read the rules of the game
and with value i meant the value of the curry compared to an currency like it is now happen to be widely used, not the created value of the the circulation of the currency.
And round about 5-10 euro a day was an estimation if this currency would be used as much as euro or dollar currently.
So i would estimate an value of 1-10 Euro per month if we are very happy at the first years
) then this person can get certified by another (eg your friendsā¦)
